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Abstract
The labor market e®ects of the recent ¯nancial and economic crisis are rather hetero-
geneous across countries and regions. Such di®erences in labor market performance
among industrialized countries are an issue of ongoing research. The objective of
this paper is to analyse labor market disparities among European regions and to
provide evidence on the factors behind these di®erences. Whereas previous research
focused on e®ects of national labor market institutions, we also take structural
characteristics of regions into account and investigate di®erences in labor demand
responsiveness and their potential determinants. The data set covers the NUTS
2 regions in the EU15 for the period 1980 to 2008. We apply an error correction
model that is combined with a spatial modeling approach in order to account for
interaction among neighboring labor markets. Our ¯ndings point to substantially
distinct labor demand responses to changes in output and wages among European
countries and regions. Moreover, the rate of adjustment to disequilibrium is sub-
ject to a signi¯cant variation across units of observation. Whereas evidence on the
signi¯cance of region speci¯c variables as explanatory factors is weak, labor market
institutions, especially regulations that a®ect the determination of wages, explain
an important fraction of the disparities.
Keywords: Regional labor markets, labor demand, institutions, Europe, error cor-
rection model.
JEL Classi¯cation: C23, J23, R23.
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The labor market e®ects of the recent ¯nancial and economic crisis are rather heteroge-
neous across countries and regions (see Eichhorst et al. 2010, Artha and de Haan 2011).
Eichhorst et al. (2010) argue that the structure of the economy as well as labor market
institutions likely in°uence the impact of the crisis. The pronounced disparities in labor
market performance among industrialized countries and their potential causes are an is-
sue of research for a long time. Di®erences in unemployment between European countries
and the US are frequently attributed to more rigid labor market institutions in Europe
(e.g. Nickell 1997). According to Decressin and Fat¶ as (1995) there is an insu±cient
response of wages to shocks in Europe compared with the US. Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) and Bertola et al. (2002) have highlighted the role of institutions as potential
determinants of these di®erences. In contrast, Solow (2000) stresses low output growth
and a corresponding weakness of labor demand as primary factors behind the persistently
high unemployment of several European economies. Evidence provided by Eichhorst et
al. (2010) suggests, however, that the e®ects of GDP reductions on labor demand and
unemployment during the recent economic crisis are marked by a considerable variation
across countries.
Our analysis of labor market disparities among European regions draws on di®erent
strands of literature: studies that deal with demand for labor, research on the labor
market e®ects of institutions and ¯nally, investigations that provide evidence on regional
labor market disparities in Europe. Previous research on demand for labor has focused
on estimating labor demand elasticities based on industry level data.1 Only a few studies
consider the impact of labor market institutions on labor demand. Neumark and Wascher
(2004) investigate the employment e®ects of minimum wages for a cross section of OECD
countries. Buscher et al. (2005) examine the impact of di®erent labor market institutions
on aggregate labor demand for a sample of EU countries. Most studies that deal with the
in°uence of labor market institutions focus on their signi¯cance with respect to the level of
unemployment or long-run changes in unemployment (e.g. Nickell et al. 2005, Blanchard
and Wolfers 2000) whereas research on regional labor market di®erences deals primarily
with the spatial pattern and persistence of unemployment disparities (e.g. Overman and
Puga 2002). Decressin and Fat¶ as (1995) investigate regional labor market dynamics in
Europe and the US. They provide empirical evidence on adjustment mechanisms to region
speci¯c shocks. Baddeley et al. (2000) analyse wage °exibility across EU regions and US
states. and explore if regional di®erences in wage °exibility are associated with structural
characteristics of labor markets. Herwartz and Niebuhr (2011) consider regional di®er-
ences in Okun's law and provide evidence on the main regional and national triggers of
these disparities. Elhorst (2003) notes that there is a lack of corresponding studies that
integrate research on national and regional factors for European countries. Furthermore,
evidence in Kosfeld and Dreger (2006) suggests that an analysis at the regional level has
to account for spatial dependence since regions are linked by labor mobility, aggregate de-
mand and other forms of interaction. Summing up, evidence on the impact of institutions
and characteristics of regional labor markets on labor demand is scarce.
1See Hamermesh (1986) for a survey.
2Responding to this lack of comprehensive ¯ndings this analysis attempts to integrate
the di®erent strands of literature and investigates several aspects of regional labor market
performance. The objective of this paper is to analyse labor market disparities among
European regions and to provide evidence on both national and regional factors behind
these di®erences. Regional labor markets in Europe exhibit considerable diversity and,
thus, provide a good basis to uncover potential factors behind detected heterogeneity of
labor market performance. The focus is on regional labor demand that is speci¯ed by
means of an error correction model (ECM) coupled with a so-called spatial error speci¯-
cation (SEM, Anselin 1988) in order to account for spatial interaction among neighboring
labor markets. We refrain from imposing strong homogeneity restrictions on the models'
slope parameters and investigate if marginal responses of employment with respect to
output and wages di®er signi¯cantly among regions and countries in Europe. Moreover,
the adjustment of labor demand in response to violations of the long run equilibrium is
subjected to regional and national di®erentiation. Intuitively one may imagine that mea-
surable cross sectional features impact on the responsiveness of employment to output
and factor prices as well as on the speed of adjustment of labor demand. To uncover po-
tential triggers of distinguished labor market performance we follow a two step approach:
After estimating region speci¯c adjustment coe±cients and labor demand responses to
output and factor prices these estimates are subjected to surface regressions conditioning
on exogenous national and regional characteristics.
Our ¯ndings point to a considerable variation in the marginal responses of labor de-
mand to output and wages across and within EU countries. Moreover, the rate of adjust-
ment of labor demand to deviations from the long run equilibrium spreads across regional
labor markets. The results of surface regressions suggest that di®erent labor market
institution matter for regional labor demand. Especially regulations that in°uence the
determination of wages seem to play a signi¯cant role. In contrast, characteristics of
regional labor markets appear to be of minor importance for di®erences in labor demand.
The next Section provides a brief view at the empirical literature on the links between
labor market performance, institutions and structural characteristics of regional labor
markets and motivates our choice of potential triggers of labor market performance. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the error correction model with spatial error distribution (ECM/SEM)
and the strategy employed to uncover potential factors behind the region speci¯c model
speci¯cation. The data is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 provides the empirical results.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Triggers of region speci¯c labor market performance
An extensive literature has examined the e®ects of labor market institutions on labor mar-
ket outcomes.2 Altogether, this literature has documented that rigid institutions tend to
increase unemployment. If a speci¯c regulation exerts an adverse or bene¯cial e®ect on
market performance depends, however, on the type of the considered institution. Most
studies point to signi¯cant e®ects of the unemployment bene¯t system. According to
2See Herwartz and Niebuhr (2011) for a discussion with respect to Okun's Law.
3Nickell and Layard (1999) generous and long-lasting bene¯t entitlements generate higher
unemployment. Unemployment insurance reduces the search e®ort and increases reser-
vation wages, thereby resulting in fewer matches between employers and workers and in
fewer o®ers being accepted. Checchi and Garc¶ ³a-Pe~ nalosa (2008) argue that high labor tax
rates have similar e®ects because labor taxation increases labor costs and thereby reduces
labor demand. Furthermore, strong trade unions are expected to raise unemployment.
Evidence in Eichhorst et al. (2010) suggests that countries with a low collective bargain-
ing coverage tend to be characterized by a relatively high wage °exibility. The adverse
e®ects of strong trade unions might, however, be o®set if wage setting is characterized by
highly coordinated bargaining (Nickell and Layard 1999).
Findings are less clear-cut for other institutions. There is no unambiguous evidence
that stricter labor standards and employment protection legislation (EPL) result in higher
unemployment. Since EPL reduces the risk of job loss and shifts associated costs from
workers to employers the latter might refrain from ¯ring in downturns but also from
hiring in booms. Thus, the overall e®ect of EPL on employment is ambiguous. Bertola
et al. (2002) detect a signi¯cantly positive impact of EPL on unemployment, however,
Nickel et al. (2005) argue that this correlation mainly operates via the e®ect of EPL on
unemployment persistence. There is also no clear indication that minimum wages a®ect
employment growth or unemployment. Eichhorst et al. (2010) also point to the capacity
of labor market institutions to absorb shocks. The bene¯t system, for instance, might
act as an automatic stabilizer during recessions. Agell (1999) concludes that although it
seems likely that certain institutions adversely a®ect labor market performance, others
might give rise to bene¯cial e®ects.3
Apart from the institutional settings other factors are most likely to impact on regional
labor market performance. Firstly, the sectoral structure of the economy possibly a®ects
the responsiveness of labor demand to output growth. Economies specialized in services
tend to be characterized by a relatively high employment intensity of growth since labor
productivity is low in this sector. The same argument applies to construction. In the
light of productivity di®erences across industries, one might expect stronger marginal
responses of labor demand to output in regions that are characterized by high shares of
technologically less developed branches (see e.g. Mourre (2004)).
Secondly, referring to the reallocative aspect of growth emphasized in Aghion and
Howitt (1994) structural change may in°uence the labor market e®ects of output varia-
tions. The implementation of new technologies requires labor reallocation, i.e. permanent
shifts of labor demand between sectors. Thus, the intensity of structural change might
matter since - with given labor market °exibility - regions characterized by more pro-
nounced reallocation of jobs between industries face higher adjustment burdens. Match-
ing frictions can arise because of industry-speci¯c skills. Skill requirements in expanding
branches may not coincide with skills possessed by workers laid o® in declining industries
(Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). Therefore the marginal e®ect of output changes on labor
demand might be smaller in economies characterized by fast structural change. However,
this e®ect could be o®set if structural change goes along with a relative strengthening of
3Checchi and Garc¶ ³a-Pe~ nalosa (2008) note that some institutions might also have con°icting labor
market e®ects.
4employment intensive service industries.
Thirdly, agglomeration economies most likely a®ect the matching process in regional
labor markets. The likelihood of a match possibly improves when more agents try to
match. In case of increasing returns to scale a proportional increase in the number of
job seekers and vacancies results in a more than proportional increase in job matches.
More vacant jobs and job seekers reduce search frictions on local labor markets and the
proportion of unemployed workers (Duranton and Puga 2004). Bene¯ts of a matching
function that exhibits increasing returns to scale accrue in dense urban labor markets.
Therefore, one might expect that output growth results in more pronounced increases of
employment in highly agglomerated regions in comparison with rural labor markets.
Moreover, drawing upon suggestions in Elhorst (2003) the age structure of the labor
force, labor market participation and the educational attainment of the population as
potential factors could contribute to the distinguished performance of regional markets.
A relatively young and well-educated work force might allow a °exible and more rapid
adjustment to shocks. Similarly, regional patterns of long-term unemployment could
a®ect employment responses to changes in output and wages due to matching frictions
and insider power in wage setting.
In this paper, we analyse regional patterns of the speed of adjustment of labor demand
to deviations from the long run equilibrium and the long run e®ects of wages and aggregate
demand on employment. With regard to potential triggers of (regional) dynamics of labor
demand, we draw upon the quoted literature since labor market institutions, the sectoral
structure and other characteristics of regional labor markets are natural candidates for
a conditional description of region speci¯c employment patterns. We investigate if the
rate of adjustment of employment and the labor market responsiveness to output and
wage °uctuations depend on labor market institutions (unemployment bene¯t system,
the system of wage determination and EPL) and on structural characteristics such as
the sectoral composition of the economy, the region type or the intensity of structural
change.4
3 The spatial regression model
3.1 Model representation
The empirical analysis rests on a neoclassical framework where cost minimization of ¯rms
subject to a production constraint gives rise to an expression for labor demand as a
function of planned output and factor prices. Addison and Teixeira (2005) note that
the ECM has become the standard approach to investigate the dynamic characteristics of
labor demand. In the regression analysis, we use employment as a proxy for labor demand.
Let lit denote the log of employment in region i and year t. For a cross section comprising
N = 192 European regions the following ECM is applied to investigate regional labor
4A detailed list of considered factor variables and their de¯nitions is given in the Appendix
5demand
¢lit = ¹i + ®i(lit¡1 ¡ ¯1iqit¡1 ¡ ¯2iwit¡1 ¡ ¯3irit¡1)
+ °1i¢qit + °2i¢wit + °3i¢rit + eit; i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T: (1)
In (1) qit is the log real output, wit and rit are the log of the real prices of labor and
capital, and ¢ is short for the ¯rst di®erence operator, e.g. ¢lit = lit ¡ li;t¡1. Presample
values are available by assumption. The model (1) formalizes labor demand adjustment
in response to lagged violations of an equilibrium relationship linking labor, output and
factor prices conditional on contemporaneous growth of output and factor prices, i.e. the
latter are assumed to be weakly exogenous.5 The parameter ®i; ¡2 < ®i < 0, governs
the degree of correcting recent violations of market equilibrium. In case of ®i = ¡1 the
long run equilibrium is reestablished within one period. Thus, the larger is ®¤
i = j®i + 1j
the more persistent are deviations from the equilibrium relation. Respecting the cross
sectional dimension the model ¯ts into the framework of seemingly unrelated regressions
(Zellner 1962) if some parsimonious representation of contemporaneous error correlation
is available.
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and Á = (¹
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In (2) '¯' indicates element-by-element vector multiplication, and vectors ¹; ®; ¯j; °j;j =
1;:::;3, collect cross section speci¯c model parameter, e.g., ¯j = (¯1j;¯2j;:::;¯Nj)0. In
(3), jT is a T £ 1 vector of ones, ¢l and e are TN dimensional vectors and e.g. q¡
5When discussing estimation results we will reconsider the issue of weak exogeneity
6and ¢q are 'blockdiagonal' TN £ N dimensional matrices. Matrices like q¡ consist of
observations that are lagged by one period, i.e. q¡ = blockdiag(q0;q1;:::;qT¡1).
The introduction of cross section speci¯c parameters ¹i;¯ji;°ji; j = 1;2;3, or ®i may
follow a deterministic or random coe±cient approach. A ¯xed e®ect approach could be
justi¯ed in light of the time dimension of available data covering a period of T = 28
annual observations. A key purpose of this study is to uncover cross sectional patterns
explaining the marginal responses of labor demand to changes in output and wage level.
We follow the idea that in particular the model parameters ¯1i;¯2i and ®¤
i = j®i + 1j
depend in a systematic fashion on measurable national and regional characteristics. Given
that we do not a-priori know the most e®ective factor variables governing labor market
responsiveness, ¯rst step parameter estimates are subjected to surface regressions on
exogenous variables. For e±ciency of ¯rst step estimates we allow for potential spatial
correlation characterizing error terms eit. Distributional assumptions are addressed in the
next Section.
3.2 Correlation pattern and feasible GLS







In light of the large cross section dimension which exceeds the time dimension by a factor
of more than 6 it is not possible to estimate ­ without structural assumptions. Single
region regressions reveal that (estimated) residual variances di®er markedly across regions.
Moreover, geographic distance is likely governing the dependence of error terms. For both
reasons, diagnosed heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation, we construct estimates of ­
from (unrestricted) cross sectionally heterogeneous variances combined with a correlation
pattern built from a spatial weights matrix. To be explicit,
­ = §
1=2R§











with R denoting the correlation matrix associated with ­. To implement GLS estimation
the a-priori presumed correlation pattern and variance estimates are, respectively,
















In (7) jZj is the column dimension of Z, W is a known spatial N £ N weights matrix
with zero diagonal elements and ^ ½ is an estimated scalar spatial correlation parameter,
¡1 < ½ < 1. By construction the rows of W sum to unity. As characterized by (2) and
(6) the ECM/SEM can be estimated by means of the following feasible GLS estimator:
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We use an iterative feasible GLS approach. At each step of the iteration a grid search
over parameters ~ ½ = 0:01r; r = ¡99;¡98;:::;99, (Cochrane-Orcutt 1949) is employed to
determine the correlation pattern that maximizes the log likelihood in (9). Providing an
outer loop for adjusting the cross sectional variances the feasible GLS estimator is obtained
after convergence of the log likelihood. The log likelihood estimates o®er guidance to
determine the most preferable choice of the spatial weights matrix W in (7) from a set
of alternative suggestions. The common OLS estimator corresponding to (8) is obtained
with choosing R = IN, or equivalently W = 0.
3.3 Surface regressions
From ¯rst step feasible GLS regressions we obtain N-dimensional vectors of coe±cients
(^ ®
¤; ^ ¯1, ^ ¯2). In a second modeling step, these parameter estimates are conditioned on
measurable cross sectional characteristics. A priori it is unlikely that all these conditioning
variables govern cross sectional parameter variation jointly such that the determination of
a suitable subset model becomes an essential modeling step. In light of the large dimen-
sion of the set of potential conditioning variables we employ a speci¯c-to-general strategy
building on Lagrange Multiplier (LM) speci¯cation tests (Godfrey 1988). Herwartz (2010)
recommends the speci¯c-to-general strategy especially for cases with relatively small sam-
ple sizes.
After initializing S = fjNg we pursue the following strategy to choose the 'most infor-
mative' set S = fjN;s1;s2;:::;sMg out of potential covariates e S = f~ sk; k = 1;:::;K; K ¸
Mg to explain measurements ^ ¯1 = (^ ¯11; ^ ¯12;:::; ^ ¯1N)0 , ^ ¯2 = (^ ¯21; ^ ¯22;:::; ^ ¯2N)0 or
^ ®¤ = (^ ®¤
1; ^ ®¤
2;:::; ^ ®¤
N)0. Referring to ^ ¯1 the sequential selection includes the following
steps:
1. Regress ^ ¯1 on S, and obtain the implied residuals, ^ " = ^ ¯1 ¡ S^ q; ^ q = (S0S)¡1S0 ^ ¯1.
2. Estimate regressions of ^ " on sets of variables Sk = fS; ~ skg; k = 1;:::; e K; where e K
is the column dimension of e S. For all regressions compute the degree of explanation,
R2
k, and an LM measure of the marginal explanatory content of ~ sk, i.e. ¸k = NR2
k.
3. The set of explanatory variables in S is augmented with the covariate ~ sk¤ that
obtains the maximum LM-statistic if ¸k¤ exceeds the (1 ¡ ±) quantile of a Â2(1)
distribution. In this case the particular variable is removed from e S.
4. Steps 1) to 3) are iterated until the largest LM statistic is insigni¯cant at level ±.
Then, the variables in S are regarded 'most e®ective' in explaining ^ ¯1. Noting that
sequential testing sacri¯ces control over the exact signi¯cance level we will refer to
± as the tuning level of the selection procedure.
84 Data
We investigate regional labor demand for a cross section of 192 EU15 regions (NUTS
2 level) based upon annual data on employment, real Gross Value Added (GVA) and
compensation per employee for the period 1980 to 2008.6 The corresponding information
is taken from the European regional database of Cambridge Econometrics (CE) which,
in turn, draws upon the EUROSTAT Regio database and o±cial data from national
providers. The data on national interest rates are collected from the annual macroeco-
nomic database (AMECO) of the European Commission's Directorate General for Eco-
nomic and Financial A®airs (DG ECFIN). Missing data of Sweden, Portugal and Greece
are replaced by data extracted from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
As outlined in Section 2 numerous factors might a®ect the marginal response of labor
demand to changes in output and wage level. In the surface regressions, we consider
country speci¯c and region speci¯c in°uences. Out of the full set of 37 conditioning
variables 9, respectively 10, factor measures are incomplete as quotes for regions in Greece,
respectively Greece and Ireland, are not available. In principle, surface regressions become
infeasible or involve considerable loss of information if for particular cross section members
factor observations are not available. Since for most factor variables cross sectional data
are complete we decide in favor of a simple nearest neighbor imputation technique as
described in Herwartz and Niebuhr (2011). The factor variables allow a classi¯cation in
two categories that are brie°y described in turn.
Country speci¯c factors At the country level we consider the OECD indicators of la-
bor market institutions (OECD 2004) that refer to three main areas: the unemployment
bene¯t system, wage determination and employment protection (Nickell et al. 2005).
Measurable features of the bene¯t system include the unemployment bene¯t replace-
ment ratio, the duration of entitlement and expenditures on active labor market policies.
Variables referring to wage determination comprise collective bargaining coverage, union
density, a coordination index that captures the extent to which bargaining is coordinated
and information on extension laws. Moreover, the OECD index of the strictness of EPL,
its variation in the 1980s, and the total labor tax rate are included in the factor set.
We allow these factors to in°uence the marginal responses of labor demand to GDP and
wages as well as the adjustment speed.
Region speci¯c factors Potential regional determinants of labor demand responsive-
ness include the percentages of regional employment across 15 distinct industries. In the
surface regressions, sector speci¯c time means of annual employment shares enter as (po-
tential) explanatory variables. As an indicator for the intensity of structural change we
6Exceptions to the NUTS 2 level include Denmark (3 former NUTS regions) and Germany (East Ger-
man regions and Berlin excluded). Furthermore, D¶ epartements d'outre-Mer (France), A» cores, Madeira
(Portugal), Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias (Spain) are not considered because of data restrictions. Information
on compensation per employee is available at NUTS 1 level only for Germany and Sweden. In these cases
we assigned NUTS 1 wage data to corresponding NUTS 2 observations in the ¯rst stage regressions.
9include the sum of absolute annual changes in employment shares between 1980 and 2008
across all industries. Employment data is taken from the CE database.
To address agglomeration economies we rely on a density indicator derived from pop-
ulation ¯gures and a partition of EU regions into spatial categories. Conditional on pop-
ulation density and the size of regional centers three groups of regions are distinguished
(agglomerated, urbanized and rural regions). Moreover, accessibility of a region is con-
sidered by means of population potential. The classi¯cation scheme and the accessibility
measure are taken from the database established by the Study Program on European
Spatial Planning (SPESP).7
Further factor variables are considered as proxies for structural characteristics of re-
gional labor markets. These include the age structure (shares of young and old workers
in total work force), the educational attainment (share of high- and low-skilled workers),
participation rates and the share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment. The
labor market indicators originate from the EUROSTAT Regio database.
We restrict e®ects of region speci¯c factors primarily to the employment intensity of
output changes. In contrast, most of the regional factors should be of minor importance
for wage °exibility and speed of adjustment. In the corresponding surface regressions we
only consider the share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment as a potential
explanatory factor at the regional level as it might re°ect insider power in wage setting.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Model selection and diagnostics
OLS diagnostics Cross sectional heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by means of a F-ratio
of two cross section speci¯c OLS variance estimates fij = ^ ¾2
i=^ ¾2
j; i 6= j. In total we
perform N(N ¡ 1)=2 = 18336 pairwise comparisons of estimated error variances. With
5% signi¯cance the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected if fij is too small or
too large in comparison with the .025 or .975 quantile of the respective F¡distribution.
The actual rejection rate is 50.1%. Given the likelihood of cross section speci¯c variances
we decide in favor of the (generalized) ECM/SEM outlined in Section 3.2.
OLS regressions deliver 192 sequences of estimated error terms subjected to testing for
¯rst order serial correlation by means of an LM test (Godfrey 1978). The actual rejection
rate for testing with 5% signi¯cance is 25.0%. Given the moderate time dimension, ¯nding
25.0% signi¯cant test statistics does not mirror 'severe' model misspeci¯cation.8 Therefore
we do not further discuss potential speci¯cation improvements for single region models.
Spatial correlation Feasible GLS estimation in (8) requires some presumption on the
structure of spatial interaction. For choosing among alternative settings of W the (max-
7See SPESP indicator set: http://www.bbr.bund.de/raumordnung/europa/espon.htm.
8It is noteworthy that individual test decisions are not independent as a consequence of spatial er-
ror correlation. Therefore, even under the null hypothesis the empirical rejection frequencies do not
necessarily correspond to the nominal level of the test.
10imized) log-likelihood as given in (9) provides useful guidance. We consider three al-
ternative 'raw' adjacency matrices f W in this analysis. A ¯rst and frequently applied
speci¯cation is a binary spatial weights matrix such that ~ wij = 1 if the regions i and j
share a border and ~ wij = 0 otherwise. Secondly, ~ wij is set to the inverse of travel time
between the capitals of regions i and j. Thirdly, we use the inverse of travel time for
regions within the same country and set ~ wij = 0 for regions located in distinct countries.
From the 'raw' matrices f W spatial weights matrices W are derived by normalizing such
that
P
j wij = 1; 8i.
The following display documents alternative log-likelihood estimates of the ECM/SEM
and provides a comparison with the OLS regression:
OLS W binary W travel W travel border
21059.64 21727.67 21865.58 21915.54
Apparently, spatial models o®er a marked improvement of ¯tting accuracy and in
particular, specifying the weight matrix with (inverse) travel times within countries o®ers
the most accurate data description. The choice of the weights matrix 'travel border'
is also in line with economic intuition. Spatial dependence of regional labor market
performance is likely caused by migration and commuting. As both forms of labor mobility
are in°uenced by frictional e®ects of geographical distance, a weighting scheme based on
inverse distance should be a more appropriate speci¯cation than a simple binary weights
matrix. However, labor mobility across national borders is still low in the EU15. This
suggests to restrict spatial interaction to national labor markets. The di®erences in log-
likelihood estimates between 'travel' and 'travel border' re°ect this feature of EU15 labor
markets.9
Weak exogeneity The model outset in (1) is a cross sectional collection of single equa-
tion ECMs formalized under the assumption of weak exogeneity of output and factor
prices. To address the issue of potential endogeneity of ¢qit, ¢wit or ¢rit we perform
ECM/SEM type regressions for these variables conditioning on the presumed equilibrium
relation, a constant and one autoregressive lag. Interestingly all these ECM/SEM im-
plementations are in favor of the weights matrix 'travel border' and support the SEM in
comparison with OLS. Over the cross section of 192 adjustment parameters we obtain
the median estimates and intervals covering 90% of the estimators, 0:206[¡0:219;0:682]
(output), 0:201[¡0:246;0:548] (wages) and 0:003[¡0:004;0:011] (capital cost). Although
these parameter estimates are skewed to the right and thereby hint at potential endo-
geneity for single covariates or regions, they hardly call for a fully °edged multivariate
ECM/SEM approach. Taking the respective statistics for the adjustment of labor, -0.392
[¡0:799;¡0:164], it is apparent that labor demand reacts most strongly and uniformly to
violations of longer term relations between labor demand, output and factor prices.
With regard to biases invoked by incidential endogeneity it is noteworthy that ad-
justment parameters for labor change only mildly if the model in (1) is fully speci¯ed in
9Similar evidence with respect to Okun's law is provided in Kosfeld and Dreger (2006) as well as
Herwartz and Niebuhr (2011).
11terms of predetermined variables. Conditioning labor changes on the presumed equilib-
rium, lagged changes of output and factor prices, and an autoregressive component the
median and 90% range of adjustment coe±cient estimates is ¡0:435[¡0:969;¡0:074].
5.2 Distributional features of estimated ¯rst stage coe±cients
The systematic di®erences in log-likelihood estimates between non-spatial and the spatial
models point to the importance of spatial dependence as regards regional labor demand.
Therefore we focus on the estimates of the spatial ECM for weights matrix 'travel border'
in the following. Table 1 summarizes the distributional features of selected coe±cients
included in (1). We only display the adjustment coe±cient and the long run e®ects of
GDP and factor prices.10 At the mean group level of inference the error correction param-
eter is negative at common signi¯cance levels and, moreover, the documented quantiles
for this coe±cient strongly indicate that the ECM formalizes intuitive adjustment dy-
namics for the vast majority of cross sections.11 The mean EC parameter is -0.392. This
corresponds with evidence in Addison and Teixeira (2005). They estimate the speed of
employment adjustment for Portugal (-0.342) and Germany (-0.108). The signs of the
average elasticity parameters correspond with theoretical expectation. As indicated by
the interquartile range or 95% coverage intervals the distribution of parameter estimates
for GDP is concentrated to the right from zero. The same applies to the region speci¯c
wage coe±cients with the majority of estimates being located left from zero. Moreover,
the size of the e®ects in absolute terms is in line with some previous estimates of labor
demand functions. The median coe±cient estimates for output and wage level are 0.596
and -0.380 respectively. Estimates of demand responses to wages range between -0.04
and -1.09 in a survey by Hamermesh (1986). Falk and Koebel (2001) apply a dynamic
labor demand model to German manufacturing and detect wage e®ects on labor demand
between -0.10 and -0.21. Corresponding results in Buscher et al. (2005) vary between
-0.08 and -0.99 for a cross section of European countries. Output coe±cients in Buscher
et al. (2005) exceed 0.5 (range from 0.53 to 1.64). Hamermesh (1993) reports long run
output e®ects from 0.03 to 0.98. In summary, our estimated coe±cients are well within
the range that can be found in the related literature.
As shown in the Figures 1 to 3 the estimated coe±cients ^ ®i, ^ ¯1i and ^ ¯2i are marked
by a substantial variation across both, regions and countries. Figure 1 displays the cross
country and within country dispersion of the adjustment coe±cient. There is both varia-
tion at the country and at the regional level. At the national level Luxembourg (-0.061)
reveals a much slower rate of adjustment to disequilibrium than the UK (-0.559). Coun-
try speci¯c medians of GDP coe±cients vary between 0.250 for Spain and 0.863 for the
Netherlands. As regards the impact of wages on employment we get a rather small e®ect
for Luxembourg (-0.054), whereas wages seem to play a prominent role for regional labor
10Regression results for the short run coe±cients are available upon request.
11Interestingly, smallest EC parameters in absolute value are obtained for the two NUTS2 regions in
Ireland. For these regions we fail to diagnose cointegration and, as a consequence, the model implied
long run output and wage elasticities are rather large in absolute value. To keep graphical displays of
estimation results at a reasonable scale, later, results for Irish regions are excluded from respective ¯gures.
12Table 1: Coe±cient estimates for labor demand functions
MG quantiles
¹ ¢ t(¹ ¢) .025 .05 .10 .25 .50 .75 .90 .95 .975
ECM/SEM
^ ®i -0.421 -31.42 -0.894 -0.799 -0.677 -0.490 -0.392 -0.312 -0.246 -0.164 -0.092
^ ¯1i 0.594 22.01 -0.165 0.113 0.201 0.362 0.596 0.764 1.020 1.184 1.382
^ ¯2i -0.422 -15.50 -1.170 -1.118 -0.785 -0.554 -0.380 -0.243 -0.152 -0.066 0.017
^ ¯3i 0.437 8.10 -0.114 -0.048 0.011 0.094 0.231 0.443 1.034 1.423 2.167
Notes: The table provides average estimated coe±cients ('¹ ¢'), a corresponding mean group
(MG) t¡ratio and selected quantiles of the unconditional distribution of cross sectional
ECM/SEM estimates ^ ®i (error correction parameters) and cointegration parameters ^ ¯1
(output), ^ ¯2 (wages) and ^ ¯3 (captial cost). The spatial weights matrix is 'travel border',
^ ½ = 0:90.
demand in the Netherlands (-0.809). Although there is some variation of wage coe±cients
within speci¯c countries, intra-national dispersion seems to be small compared with cross
country variance. This becomes even more apparent if we compare Figure 2 and Fig-
ure 3. Country speci¯c output coe±cients show considerable variation as well. However,
relative to di®erences at the country level disparities within countries seem to be more
pronounced when compared with intra- and international variance of wage coe±cients.
This might be interpreted as a ¯rst indication for the signi¯cance of national factors such
as labor market institutions in explaining di®erences in wage coe±cients. In contrast, the
distributional features of the output coe±cients suggests that labor market institutions
alone cannot account for the entire variation of estimates since they cannot capture the
distinct disparities between coe±cients of regions located in the same country.
5.3 Determinants of regional labor demand responses
Having described the distributional properties of cross sectional labor market responsive-
ness we now characterize the cross sectional shape by means of surface regressions. When
implementing surface regressions it turned out that the outcome of the model selection
strategy depends on some outlying estimates that are also depicted in the Figures 1 to 3.
In light of this dependence we decide to remove the C largest and smallest parameter esti-
mates from the sample of cross sectional estimates. The number of removed tail estimates
is chosen as C = 5;8;10. Consequently, the following results are 'representative' for a
cross section of 171 up to 181 regions since Luxembourg is also excluded from the surface
regressions owing to missing factor observations. In order to provide some evidence on
the robustness of the surface regressions we discuss results for two values of C and the
two applied tuning levels.
Table 2 documents the surface regression estimates ^ qfin for the adjustment coe±cients
along with standard t¡statistics and heteroskedasticity consistent t¡ratios (White 1980).
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Figure 1: Distribution of estimated error correction parameters (^ ®i, ECM/SEM, 'travel
border', ^ ½ = 0:90) within and across European countries. Austria AU (9 regions), Belgium
BE (11), Germany GE (30), Denmark DK (3), Finland FI (5), France FR (22), Greece GR
(13), Italy IT (20), Luxemburg LU (1), Netherlands NE (10), Portugal PT (5), Sweden SE
(8), Spain ES (16), United Kingdom UK (37). The box represents the interquartile range
of estimated adjustment coe±cients and the horizontal line corresponds to the median.
The whiskers mark the last observation within 1.5 times the interquartile range. Estimates
outside this support are classi¯ed as outliers.
With regard to sample trimming we mostly discuss results for C = 5 since this choice
obtains most selected factors. Although the sequential selection of explanatory variables
forgives exact control over the statistical signi¯cance level, it is noteworthy that almost
all robust t¡ratios exceed absolute values of 2.3, say, underscoring signi¯cance at con-
ventional levels. This also refers to the corresponding results of the wage and output
coe±cients (see Tables 3 and 4). However, it is not only interesting to consider the docu-
mented coe±cient estimates but also to keep in mind that particular factor variables have
been ruled out according to apparently low explanatory content.
The results of the surface regression for adjustment coe±cients after trimming with
C = 5 and ± = 0:01 indicate that some labor market institutions indeed a®ect the speed of
adjustment of labor demand in response to deviations from the long run equilibrium. Both
selected factors reduce the speed of adjustment according to our results. The transformed
adjustment coe±cient ®¤
i increases, on average, by 0.12 if the wage determination of the
country is subject to extension laws. Considering that the average adjustment parameter
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Figure 2: Distribution of estimated responses to wages (^ ¯2i, ECM/SEM, 'travel border',
^ ½ = 0:90) within and across European countries. For further notes see Figure 1.
combinations as regards the number of excluded outliers (C) and tuning levels (±) indicate
that this seems to form the lower limit of the impact. Altogether the in°uence of extension
laws is fairly robust and the partial degree of explanation (R2
p = :11) suggests that it is
an important factor - although the R2
p varies across the displayed combinations of C and
±.
The second institutional factor that impacts on the adjustment speed of labor demand
is EPL. The result is in line with theoretical arguments since the positive and signi¯cant
coe±cient indicates that strict legislation tends to reduce the °exibility of labor demand.
The OECD employment protection index ranges from 0.35 (UK) to 1.93 (Portugal). This
variation in EPL translates into a di®erence in the adjustment coe±cient of 0.05 if we
apply the estimate for C = 5 and ± = 0:01 and 0.17 for the combination C = 5 and
± = 0:05. The R2
p of the factor varies between 6% and 10%. Finally, the selection of the
unemployment bene¯t replacement ratio for two out of three constellations points to the
role of the bene¯t system as regards a swift adjustment of labor demand to shocks. Again
considering the size of the e®ect as implied by the cross country variation of the ratio
(in 1999 from 0.17 in the UK to 0.74 in Sweden) we arrive at a di®erence in the rate of
adjustment of 0.06. Moreover, the average replacement ratio increased by 5 percentage
points between 1980 and 1999. This gives rise to an average increase of the transformed
adjustment coe±cient by merely 0.005 (0.9% of the average ECM/SEM estimate ¹ ®). Thus,
compared with the impact of the extension laws these e®ects are rather small. Moreover,




































AU BE DK ES FI FR GE GR IT LU NL PT SE UK
Figure 3: Distribution of estimated responses to output (^ ¯1i, ECM/SEM, 'travel border',
^ ½ = 0:90) within and across European countries. For further notes see Figure 1.
two selected factors.
In Table 3 the results of surface regressions for the wage coe±cients ^ ¯2i are summarized.
The factor selection for the region speci¯c responses to wages seems to be even more
robust with respect to a variation of C and ± than the corresponding ¯ndings for the
adjustment coe±cients. The group of selected factors does not change at all for the
three combinations.12 A comparison of partial degrees of explanation in Table 3 suggests
that primarily active labor market policy matters for labor demand responses to wage
changes. According to the partial R2 more than 30% of the variation of region speci¯c
wage coe±cients can be explained by cross country di®erences in the expenditure on active
labor market policies. Thus, it is by far the most important factor as regards the marginal
employment response to wages. The negative and highly signi¯cant coe±cient of the factor
indicates that countries that spend a relatively large share of GDP on such measures, e.g.
Denmark (1.7% of GDP in 1998), tend to achieve more pronounced employment e®ects
for a given change of the wage level than countries such as the UK or Austria (0.34% and
0.44% of GDP, respectively) where labor market policies play a much less prominent role.
Applying the maximum spread of GDP shares we get a di®erence in the long run wage
12Only for C = 8 we detect slight changes with respect to the selected factors. We restrict the
presentation of results in Table 3 to the combinations with C = 5 since deviations in estimates for
C = 10 are marginal. The selection procedure identi¯es the same factor variables with only slight
changes of their estimated impacts as a consequence of distinct trimming. The regression results for all
other combinations of C and ± are available upon request.
16Table 2: Surface regressions for region speci¯c rate of adjustment
Var. Description ^ qfin t-rat rob. t R2
p pLM
C = 5;± = 0:01
- Constant 0.426 19.30 16.16 0.629 0.00
6 Extension laws 0.118 4.674 4.767 0.108 0.00
9 EPL late 1980s 0.029 3.294 3.689 0.057 0.13
C = 5;± = 0:05
- Constant 0.391 14.34 12.03 0.504 0.00
6 Extension laws 0.137 2.156 2.418 0.025 0.00
9 EPL late 1980s 0.111 4.404 4.657 0.098 0.13
1 Unemployment bene¯t replacement rat. 0.021 2.212 2.725 0.027 3.14
C = 10;± = 0:01
- Constant 0.451 17.41 15.88 0.613 0.00
6 Extension laws 0.142 2.615 2.685 0.039 0.00
1 Unemployment bene¯t replacement rat. 0.099 4.603 4.399 0.111 0.97
Notes: Estimation results are coe±cient estimates ^ qfin, 't-rat' and 'rob t' are the com-
mon and heteroskedasticity consistent t¡ratios (White 1980). R2
p is the partial degree of
explanation associated to particular factor variables. The nominal level of the selection
procedure is ±. The ordering of variables re°ects the sequential outcome of the speci¯c-to-
general selection described in Section 3 and particular p¡values (£100) of the LM-statistic
are also given (pLM). More detailed information on the factor variables is given in the
Appendix.
coe±cients of 0.51. This even exceeds the average wage coe±cient (-0.42).
The other institutional factors selected at the second stage of our regression analysis
adversely a®ect the marginal wage e®ect. We get a dampening e®ect of the total labor tax
rate on the impact of wages on employment. This factor explains around 5% of the wage
coe±cient's variance. The tax rate is rather low in Ireland (mean rate in the period 1996-
2000: 33%), whereas in Scandinavian countries and especially in Sweden taxation of labor
is much higher. In the latter country the tax rate on average amounted to 77% between
1996 and 2000. A decline of the labor tax rate by 1 percentage point will, according to
our estimates reduce the wage coe±cient by 0.098. This correspond with a decrease of
the average wage coe±cient by more than 20%. Furthermore, the estimates suggest that
extension laws a®ect the labor demand response to wage changes. The partial R2 (19%)
points to an important contribution of this factor to the explanation of cross country
di®erences in the wage coe±cient. However, extending bargained wages to non-union
¯rms increases the marginal wage e®ect by only 0.012. This is less than 3% of the average
wage coe±cient.
Finally, Table 4 shows the results of the selection procedure for the region speci¯c
output coe±cients. Although the number of selected factors is large compared with the
surface estimates for the adjustment and the wage coe±cient robust evidence on in°uential
factors is scarce. Both national factors and region speci¯c features are selected and seem
17Table 3: Surface regressions for long run region speci¯c labor demand responses to wage
Var. Description ^ qfin t-rat rob. t R2
p pLM
C = 5;± = 0:01; C = 5;± = 0:05 (C = 10;± = 0:01)
- Constant -0.732 -8.625 -8.742 0.288 0.00
3 Active labor market policy -0.383 -9.800 -9.751 0.349 0.00
8 Total labor tax rate 0.098 3.188 3.239 0.054 0.00
6 Extension laws 0.012 6.562 6.666 0.194 0.17
Notes: See Table 2.
to a®ect the size of labor demand responses to output variations. The estimates for the
three combinations of C and ± are characterized by a considerable variation with respect
to selected factors, signs of coe±cients and size of e®ects. Evidence on region speci¯c
factors is altogether weak with only three corresponding indicators being selected. The
estimated coe±cient of fuels and chemicals (C = 5, ± = 0:05) implies that a specialization
in this branch reduces the impact of output changes on labor demand. This is consistent
with the productivity argument put forth in Section 2. Moreover, the participation rate
and the share of low skilled labor are chosen for some combinations of C and ±. However,
the selection of all regional factors is not robust with respect to a variation of sample
trimming (C) and tuning level (±). Due to this lack of robustness we refrain from a
detailed discussion of the corresponding results.
The results suggest that labor market institutions are the main drivers of cross regional
variation of output coe±cients since corresponding ¯ndings and especially evidence on the
coordination of wage bargaining are fairly stable. The factor is selected in all combina-
tions. There are no changes of the sign of the coe±cient across distinct constellations
and only minor changes of the size. The partial degree of explanation indicates that the
coordination index of wage bargaining (R2
p = :16 for C = 5, ± = 0:01) is an in°uential fac-
tor with respect to labor demand responses to output. Coordination of wage bargaining
tends to increase the impact of GDP on employment. The positive e®ect of coordination
corresponds with the role of coordinated bargaining discussed in the literature. Nick-
ell and Layard (1999) argue that the extent to which bargaining is coordinated might
matter for labor demand since highly coordinated bargaining can o®set adverse e®ects
of unionism. By implication, countries marked by a high degree of consensus between
the actors in collective bargaining such as Germany and Austria should, ceteris paribus,
realize stronger impacts of output changes on employment than Italy that shows only a
medium degree of coordination.
There is more plausible evidence on signi¯cant e®ects of di®erent labor market institu-
tions. Extension laws and EPL are associated with a decline of the output coe±cient. In
line with theory and previous empirical evidence high union density tends to reduce labor
demand e®ects of output variations. Since these factors enter the surface regression only
for speci¯c trimming (C) and tuning levels (±) we do not put to much emphasis on them
and refrain from a discussion of the size of corresponding e®ects. The same applies to the
impact of the unemployment bene¯t replacement ratio. Although this factor is selected
18for all combinations summarized in Table 4 a consistent interpretation is impeded by the
changing sign of the coe±cient.
Table 4: Surface regressions for long run region speci¯c labor demand responses to output
Var. Description ^ qfin t-rat rob. t R2
p pLM
C = 5;± = 0:01
- Constant 1.387 8.520 6.923 0.286 0.00
7 Coordination index 0.595 5.730 5.511 0.155 0.00
1 Unemployment bene¯t replacement ratio -0.269 -9.082 -13.14 0.315 0.00
17 Participation rate -0.009 -3.253 -2.864 0.056 0.14
C = 5;± = 0:05
- Constant 1.062 5.455 3.812 0.144 0.00
7 Coordination index 0.610 5.302 4.822 0.138 0.00
1 Unemployment bene¯t replacement rat. 0.004 3.351 3.557 0.060 0.00
17 Participation rate 0.160 2.444 2.031 0.033 0.14
10 Change EPL -0.297 -7.786 -9.231 0.257 2.82
5 Union density -0.506 -3.243 -3.331 0.057 1.04
6 Extension laws -0.005 -1.484 -1.115 0.012 2.74
25 Fuels and Chemicals -2.827 -2.072 -2.118 0.024 3.63
C = 10;± = 0:01
- Constant 1.200 15.84 16.87 0.593 0.00
7 Coordination index 0.414 4.471 4.055 0.107 0.00
1 Unemployment bene¯t replacement rat. 0.210 5.081 4.545 0.134 0.00
6 Extension laws -0.474 -11.65 -13.37 0.448 0.18
9 EPL late 1980s -0.616 -4.324 -4.097 0.101 0.11
15 Share low skilled workers 0.084 5.199 4.845 0.139 0.00
Notes: See Table 2
196 Conclusions
We detect a considerable variation in the marginal responses of labor demand to output
and wages across and within EU countries. Moreover, the speed of adjustment of labor
demand to deviations from the long run equilibrium spreads across regional labor markets.
The dispersion within speci¯c countries tends to be more pronounced for output coe±-
cients than for wage e®ects and the rate of adjustment. The variance of region speci¯c
employment e®ects points to national as well as regional factors as potential causes. But
evidence on signi¯cance of region speci¯c factors is rather weak. There is some indica-
tion for the sectoral structure of regional labor markets and the participation rate might
matter for employment e®ects of output. However, corresponding ¯ndings are not robust.
The poor performance of region speci¯c characteristics does not, however, imply that the
regional dimension is irrelevant in this context. Our ¯ndings show that spatial dependence
matters for regional labor demand. Taking into account interaction among neighboring
regions signi¯cantly improves the e±ciency of regression results. Thus, an analysis of
regional labor demand has to consider the impact of labor mobility and demand linkages.
Whereas structural characteristics of regional labor markets seem to be of minor im-
portance for the responsiveness of labor demand, there is much evidence on the signi¯cance
of labor market institutions. We detect important e®ects on di®erent indicators of labor
market performance, more precisely on the marginal e®ects of output and wages on labor
demand as well as on the speed of adjustment. This suggests that focusing on unemploy-
ment only as variable of interest might present a too narrow perspective of the issue. The
¯ndings also indicate that speci¯c institutions seem to in°uence labor market outcomes
via di®erent channels. This applies especially to extension laws. Moreover, we discover
distinct di®erences in the size of e®ects associated with various labor market institutions.
Our ¯ndings point to adverse and bene¯cial e®ects of di®erent institutions on labor
demand that are almost uniformly in line with theoretical expectations. This corresponds
with the di®erentiated evidence on employment e®ects of institutions summarized in Blau
and Kahn (1999). Institutions that in°uence the determination of wages, in particular
extension laws and the coordination of the wage bargaining process, are important accord-
ing to our results. The extension of bargained wages to non-union ¯rms seems to a®ect
the speed of adjustment of labor demand and the long run e®ects of wages and output on
employment. The bene¯cial e®ect of coordination on the marginal response of employ-
ment to GDP corresponds with ¯ndings of previous studies. EPL impacts on the rate of
adjustment of labor demand. This e®ect might rest on its in°uence on layo®s and hirings
and conforms to the role of EPL discussed in the literature. Institutions likely in°uence
short run adjustment in the labor market since the ability of ¯rms to adjust production
to changes of aggregate demand might be subject to institutional restrictions. Moreover,
there seem to be signi¯cant e®ects of the unemployment bene¯t system. We identify ad-
verse e®ects of the unemployment bene¯t replacement ratio on the speed of adjustment of
labor demand. As regards the long run wage e®ects on employment the taxation of labor
and active labor market policies seem to matter. The last result con¯rms arguments in
Eichhorst et al. (2010) who argue that active labor market programmes mitigated adverse
labor market e®ects of the sharp decline of GDP during the recent crisis.
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CE regional database (NUTS 2 level); annual data 1980 to 2008
Employment data by region and industry (in 1000 employees); see A.2
for details on classi¯cation)
Unemployment rate (number of unemployed as a percentage of the labor force)
Gross value added (10E06 EUROS, 1995 prices)
Population density (1000 inhabitants per km2)
Compensation per employee (in EURO)
SPESP database (NUTS 2 level)
Classi¯cation scheme region types (agglomerated, urbanized, rural)
Population potential accessible by road 1996 (10E06 inhabitants)
Gross value added (10E06 EUROS, 1995 prices)
EUROSTAT Regio database (NUTS 2 level); annual data 1999 to 2002
Working population by age (15-24 years, 45-54 years, 55-64 years)
Working population by highest level of education attained according to Interna-
tional Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISCED) 1997 (ISCED0 2: Pre-
primary, primary and lower secondary education, ISCED3 4: Upper secondary
and post-secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED5 6: Tertiary education)
Total and long term unemployed (12 months and more)
Participation rate (in percent)
OECD indicators on labor market institutions (see Nickell et al. 2005 for a detailed
description of the data)
Bene¯t replacement rate (Bene¯t entitlement as a percentage of previous earnings,
data refers to ¯rst year of unemployment)
Bene¯t duration index
Expenditure on active labor market policy (Expenditure as a percentage of GDP)
Collective bargaining coverage (Percentage of employed labor force whose pay is
determined by collective agreements)
Extension laws (Dummy variable indicating that bargained wages are extended to
non-union ¯rms at the behest of one bargaining party)
Trade union density (Union members as percentage of employees)
Coordination index (Consensus of collective bargaining actors, from low (1) to high(3))
Employment protection index (Strictness of EPL).
Labor taxes (Payroll plus income plus consumption tax rates)
Notes: Due to di®erences in data availability and delineation of regions between the
various data sets some information from SPESP and data on working population had to
be adjusted for the following regions: Hovedstadsregionen, Ost for St¿reb½lt, ex.Hovedst,
Vest for St¿reb½lt, Vlaams Brabant, Brabant Wallon, Oost-Nederland, Scotland and
Wales. Weighted averages are assigned to corresponding NUTS 2 regions.
24A.2 Employed
factors explaining estimates of labor market responsiveness (^ ¯ji; j = 1;2 and ®¤
i = j^ ®i+1j)
Var. Description
1 x Unemployment bene¯t replacement ratio (mean 1980-1999)
2 x Unemployment bene¯t duration index (mean 1980-1999)
3 x Expenditure on active labor market policies (mean 1985-1998)
4 x Collective bargaining coverage (mean 1980-1994)
5 x Union density (mean 1980-1998)
6 x Dummy variable extension laws
7 x Coordination index (mean 1980-1995)
8 x Total labor tax rate (average percentage 1980-2000)
9 x OECD employment protection index late 1980s
10 x Change of EPL index 1980-1987
11 x Share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment (mean 1999-2002)
12 Accessible population by road 1996 (in 10E06 inhabitants)
13-14 Share of age groups in working population (mean 1999-2002); 13: 15-24 years;
14: 45-64 years.
15-16 Shares of low/high skilled in working population (mean 1999-2002), 15: low,
i.e. pre-primary, primary and lower secondary; 16: high, i.e. tertiary education
17 Participation rate (mean 1999-2002)
18-19 Regiontypes with agglomerated regions as reference, 18: urban; 19: rural
20-35 Mean employment shares 1980-2008, 20: Agriculture; 21: Construction;
22: Electronics; 23: Financial services; 24: Food, beverages and tobacco;
25: Fuels, chemicals, rubber and plastic products; 26: Hotels and
restaurants; 27: Mining and energy supply; 28: Non-market services;
29: Other manufacturing; 30: Other market services; 31: Textiles and
clothing; 32: Transport and communications; 33: Transport
equipment; 34: Manufacturing; 35: Market services
36 Mean population density 1980-2008 (1000 inhabitants per km2)
37 Structural change (mean sum of absolute changes in employment
shares across all industries 1981 to 2008)






L:it , where Ljit is employment in industry j in region i and time t and L:it is total
employment in region i and time t. The structural change variable for region i (factor















¯. Factor quotes for regions in Greece are not
available for factors 1-10. Moreover, factor 4 is not reported for regions in Ireland. The
left hand side column distinguishes two sets of factors, the larger set consists of all 37
factors and has been used for the modeling of output response. The smaller set consists
of those factors indicated with 'x' and has been used to model wage responsiveness and
the intensity of error correction dynamics.
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